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from the d

II argues that the district court
against him. Specifically,

dism

burden at the preliminary hearing

ish

DUI) conviction substantially
I.

court's judgment

conviction. On

it denied his motion
ues that the

failed to meet

a foreign driving under

influence

the applicable

§ '1

Mr. Schall was charged,
filed an Information Part /I,

information,

DUI. (R, pp.

) The

rging Mr. Schall with a felony enhancement for having

previously been convicted of two prior DUls in the previous ten years. (R, pp.

.)

One of the two prior offenses was alleged to have occurred in the State of Wyoming.
(R, p.41.)

According to one of the arresting Wyoming police officers, Mr. Schall

submitted to an "intoximeter" breath analysis, which resulted in a reading that
Mr. Schall's blood alcohol content (hereinafter, BAC) was .066 and .068. (Affidavit of
John H. Harris attached to the Amended Motion to Augment, p.2.) 1
At the preliminary hearing in this case, Mr. Schall argued that the State did not
have probable cause to bind him over on a felony because the Wyoming DUI statute did

1 Mr. Schall previously filed a motion to augment the record with the plaintiff's exhibits 1
and 2, which was granted by the Idaho Supreme Court. However, upon further review
of the plaintiff's exhibit 2, it contains incomplete copies of the affidavits of Officer Kidgell
and Officer Harris. As such, an amended motion to augment with complete copies of
Officer Kidgell's and Officer Harris' affidavits was filed and granted by the Idaho
Supreme Court.
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Idaho DUI

1 Tr., p.

IVlr. Sdlall if

making this argument,
\/Vyoming statute::; or an

of

1 Tr., p.

.)

1Vlr. Schall did

nle district court then
of

1Vlr. Schall had
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but

that

if it

on
of the VVyoming statute or if

judicial

could

lay the appropriate foundation. (091'13/1

provided no comment.

cl

Tr., p

(09/13/11 Tr., p

L.2·1 - p.30,

burden

statute."

substantially conforms to the Idaho
burden to get the Wyoming statute into the

.19-20.) The
.)

The magistrate

1 Tr., p.

Ls.

burden to establish the \/Vyoming

then argued that it was the

Ls.

to lay;:] foundation for

\/Vyomin(:J DUI statute.

judicial

q

a

had

and, therefore,

ma~Jistrate's

record.

State has the

(09/13/1'1 Tr., p.30,

'18.) The magistrate disagreed and concluded that it could not take judicial notice

of a foreign statute and it is the defense's burden to get the statute in the record
according to the rules of evidence.

(09/13/11 Tr., p.30, L.19 - p.31, L.2.)

The

magistrate also concluded, based on an implicit theory that the substantial conformity
requirement is an affirmative defense, that it was Mr. Schall's burden to establish that
the Wyoming DUI statute does not substantially conform to the Idaho DUI statute and
that argument should occur before the district court. (09/13/11 Tr., p.31, Ls.11-16.) The
magistrate then bound Mr. Schall over to the district court. (09/13/11 Tr., p.31, Ls.1617.)
In the district court, Mr. Schall filed a motion to dismiss, wherein he alleged that
the magistrate improperly refused to take judicial notice of the Wyoming DUI statute.
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Mr.

that

conform

a

DUI

with a BAC

cannot

, but in

the motion

court

the Wyoming

judicial

could

preliminary hearing.
prove that

and, in doing

d
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.)

nt

ing a

for a DUI. (I::Z., p.

and O.OS can be

with a

DUI

first concluded that

The d
magistrate

but that was not a requirement at the

It also concluded that Mr. Schall had the burden to

\Nyoming DUI statute did not substantially conform to the Idaho DUI

statute, and that, in fact,

VVyoming DUI

conform

Idaho's DUI statute.

, pp.

Mr. Sellall

a conditional

ilty plea to the DUI and the felony

enhancement, preserving the ability to challenge the denial of his motion to dismiss on
appeal. (R., pp.

,76-

) Thereafter, the district court imposed a unified sentence of

five years, with two years fixed, but suspended the sentence and placed Mr. Schall on
probation. 2 (R., pp.SO-S4.) Mr. Schall timely appealed. (R., pp.SS-90.)

2 Both the information and the judgment of conviction state that Mr. Schall's felony
enhancement was pursuant to I.C. § 18-8005(5) when they should have referenced
I.C. § 18-8005(6). (R., pp.40-41, 80.) However, facts in the Information allege that
Mr. Schall was previously convicted of two DUls.
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district court err
it
that \/Vyoming's DUI
substantially conforms
Idaho's DUI
preliminary hearing?

4

lrrtrod U~~J1QIl
1\;1r. Schall anjues that insufficient

was

the pn::liminary

bind him over to the district court on a felony DUI.

DUI is a misdemeanor

in Idaho. I.C. § '18-8005. How(::ver, if a person has two prior DUls and, within
a

ird DUI convictioll, I.e § 1

third DUI as a

That same

allows the
the

use a

DUI

from a foreign jurisdiction for felony enhancement purposes if the statute
under which

that foreign

I.C. § '18-8004(1).

conviction

was

predicated

substantially

conforms

to

Both the magistrate and the district court treated the substantial

conformity requirement as an affirmative defense, as opposed to an element of the
charging enhancement, shifting the burden of proof from the State to Mr, Schall.
Mr. Schall argues that at the preliminary hearing it is the State's burden to prove
that probable cause exists for every element of a charging enhancement, and that the
substantial conformance requirement is an element of the charging enhancement.

It

follows that it is the State's burden to get the foreign statute into the magistrate's record
in order to establish that the foreign conviction substantially conforms to the applicable
portions of I.C. § 18-8004.

Since the Wyoming statute was not in the magistrate's

record, and since there was no evidence indicating that the Wyoming DUI statute
substantially conforms to I.C. § 18-8004, the district court erred when it denied
Mr. Schall's motion to dismiss.
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was a sufficient

IVlr. Schall over to

court on the Information Part II,

altemative, that the
I.C. §

licable
n

the preliminary hearing to

Ing DUI statute
~1

~vlr.

Schall

, In

not substantially conform to the

and thus. his rnotion

dism

should

on that basis.

F3

"Issues of statutory int(c3rpretation present questions of law over which this Court
"

v

1

Idaho

1,

('1

"At a preliminary hearing, the state must prove only that a crime was committed
and that there is probable or sufficient cause to believe that the defendant committed it."
State v. Fain, 116 Idaho 82,84 (1989) (citing I.C.R.

1(b)), 'The finding of probable

cause must be based upon substantial evidence upon every material element of the
offense charged." State v. Munhall, 118 Idaho 602, 606 (Ct. App. 1990) (citing I.C.R.
5.1(b)). In the context of I.C. §§ 18-8004 and 18-8005, the Idaho Court of Appeals has
noted that "charging enhancements" which elevate a misdemeanor offense to a felony
offense constitute an element of the enhanced crime. State v. Moore, 148 Idaho 887,
891 n.2 (Ct. App. 2010).

The applicable charging enhancement in this case is

I.C. § 18-8005(6), which follows:
Except as provided in section 18-8004C, Idaho Code, any person who
pleads guilty to or is found guilty of a violation of the provisions of section
18-8004(1)(a), (b) or (c), Idaho Code, who previously has been found
guilty of or has pled guilty to two (2) or more violations of the provisions of
section 18-8004(1 )(a), (b) or (c), Idaho Code, or any substantially

6

conforming foreign criminal violation, or
rs, notwithstanding
ten Cl
judgment(s), shall
guilty of a felony.
a felony under I.C. § '1

In order for a DUI
burden of

provin~;J
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lise a
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under I.C.

1
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requ
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that

the

conviction

proposition that the

is an element

conform

(Ct.

opinion, which supports the

ubstantial conformance requirement contained in 1 . 1
and not an affirmative

the':!

emergency vehicle

I.

substantially

adds an

1) .

There is authority, in addition

Idaho

, the

1989), the
was at

49-645 and 49-606.

In

criminalizing the
on

appeal.

3

There

.J 16

v.
failing

for an

relevant

were

Idaho Code Section 49-645 stated that "[u]pon the

immediate approach of an authorized emergency vehicle making use of an audible or
visible signal, meeting the requirements of section 49-606, Idaho Code, the driver of
every other vehicle shall yield the right of way . . . . "

Id. at 973-974.

Idaho Code

Section 49-606 contained specific standards, such as decibel levels, for the audio and
visual signals. Id. The narrow issue on appeal was whether the requirements of former
I.C. § 49-606 constituted elements of I.C. § 49-645, which had to have been proven by
the State. The Court of Appeals employed the following rationale in ruling on this issue:
It is said generally that "the elements of a crime are its requisite (a)
conduct (act or omission to act) and (b) mental fault (except for strict
3 Failing to yield to an emergency vehicle was originally enacted as a criminal statute,
but the Idaho Legislature has since reduced it to an infraction. Monaghan, 116 Idaho at
974. However, the Monaghan Court interpreted the relevant statutes, I.C. §§ 49-645
(repealed and replaced by I.C. § 49-625) and 49-606 (repealed and replaced by
I.e. § 49-623), in accordance with their meaning when originally enacted. Id.

7

liability

attendant

SCOTT,

are
conditions are what
circumstances."

clearly
that drivers of all vehicles must yield
Section
right of way to authorized
"making use of an audible or visible
signal, meeting the requirements
section
Idaho
"
Those conditions are
out
Iy. Among other things, the vehicle
making use of an audible warning signal having a decibel rating
at a distance of ten
or must
displaying a flashing light or
visible from
direction
a c!
1
under normal
atmospheric conditions.
can only conclude from the
the
that the
lature intended
conditions
vehicle.
could
found guilty of failure to yield
an
The statutory conditions are elements of the offense. The
had the
burden to prove that at least one of the emergency warning
was In
compliance with the statutes.
lei. at

(footnote omitted).

The Court of Appeals held that the standards

governing the audio and visual signals contained in former I.C. § 49-606, constituted
"special attendant circumstances," which are an element of the offense. As such, it is
the State's burden to establish that the audio or visual signals meet the standards set
forth in former I.C. § 49-606.
In this case, the requirement that a foreign conviction being used to establish a
charging enhancement is a special attendant circumstance, which constitutes an
element of the offense.

Similar to I.C. §§ 49-645 and 49-606, the Idaho Legislature

stated in I.C. § 18-8005(6), that when a foreign conviction is used as a predicate
conviction for a felony DUI charging enhancement, the conviction must substantially
conform to a conviction obtained pursuant to I.C. § 18-8004(1). There is little difference
between the requirement that a police siren have a minimum decibel range and the
requirement that a foreign conviction substantially conform to I.C. § 18-8004(1). Due to
8

similarities, the substantially

m

ing requirement is a

condition which

a foreign conviction can

a charging

such, the district court erred when it

that the

bear the burden of establishing that a statute in a foreign jurisdiction substantially
to I.C. § 18-8004(1).

, pp.

Further support for lVlr.
Idaho

(1969),

.)

position can

found in

the Idaho Supreme Court dealt with

question of whether an

contained in a criminal statute functioned as an
the

burden

had

the defendant had the burden

or if the
prove. The lang

v.

offense which

was an affirmative defense which
of that statute

any
as otherwise provided in this act, every person who
narcotic excegLJdI2oll.. th~L written prescription of aJ2b.Y§icialJ.L~~IE?nti§1
Qodiatrist~steoQath or veterinarian license(;L1~QIactice in this state, may
be punished by imprisonment in the state prison for a term of not to
ten (10) years.
4

I.C. § 37-3202 (emphasis added).

In resolving this issue, the Idaho Supreme Court

noted the general rule, which follows:
In the absence of a statute, the general rule is that the burden is
upon the state in a criminal case to negative any exception or proviso
appearing in that part of the statute which defines the crime if the
exception is 'so incorporated with the language describing and defining
the offense that the ingredients of the offense cannot be accurately and
clearly described if the exception is omitted * * *.'

Segovia, 93 Idaho at 210 (Quoting 41 Am.Jur.2d, Indictments and Informations, § 98,
pp.940-941).

The Supreme Court went on to note that the State must aver the

exception in the Information. Id. The Segovia Court ultimately held that the exception,
or lack of a prescription, was an "integral" part of the statute because it defined that

Idaho Code Section 37-3202 has been subsequently revised and bears no
relationships to the version which existed in 1969.

4

9

crime

it is not a

u;::,:')t;:;:,::>

a narcotic dn.lfJ pursuant

liability

can

it is an integral

unrelated

that the

conviction

1), then any foreign conviction, including ones

DUI

could

used to establish a felony DUI charging

at a preliminary hearing,
conforming

an

crime.

did not

substantially

a

I.C. § 1
can

1),

without the

is nothing left in the statute modifying what type
ish

rging enhancement

a foreign conviction, such as assault, theft, or criminal
foreign

rase substantially

could

as a prior

for a felony DUI enhancement. Therefore, the substantially conforming

foreign conviction requirement is an integral portion of I.C. § 1
actually defines

it

scope of the type of foreign convictions which can be used by the

State for the charging enhancement of felony DUI.
Turning to the rationale employed by the district court's concerning this issue,
the district court relied on State v. Beloit, 123 Idaho 36 (1992), and its progeny
(R., pp.63-63), for the proposition that it is not the State's burden to establish that a prior

foreign conviction substantially conforms to I.C. § 18-8005(6).

(R., pp.63-64.)

The

district court's reliance on this case was misplaced because Beloit deals with the
question of whether a prior conviction can be collaterally attacked, not whether the
substantially conforming requirement is an element of I.C. § 18-8005(6). In that case,

Mr. Beloit was charged with a felony DUI based on three prior DUI convictions. Id. at
36. Mr. Beloit entered into a conditional guilty plea and argued on appeal that:

two of the three prior DUI convictions used by the State in enhancing his
charge from a misdemeanor to a felony were not valid convictions for

10

of the felony enhancement provisions
provided all of his constitutional rights under the United
Constitution at the
of UlOse convictions.

not

at hand

is valid is entirely distinct and

Beloit was not
or IdarlO

the question of whether a
from the question of whether a prior

foreign conviction substantially conforms

I. C. § 18-8004.

For example, in

supra, the appellant, Mr. Moore, made various appellate challenges
,.,

a foreign conviction for charging enhancement
of

challenges was whether the
challenges was

one of

1)(a), (b) or

conforrned to I.C.

the State's use of
Idaho at 89'1

conviction was constitutionally valid
the

Id. at

n conviction substantially
The Court of

in separate sections of the Moore opinion and employed an

dealt with these

entirely different analysis for each issue, as they are distinct and separate issues. Id. In
fact, the Court of Appeals discussed the Beloit opinion in the section of the Moore
opinion dealing with the question of whether the foreign conviction was constitutionally
valid.

Id. at 894-895.

As such, the district court erred when it relied on the Beloit

opinion to conclude that the State did not have the burden to establish that Wyoming's
DUI statute substantially conforms to I.C. § 18-8004(1).
In sum, charging enhancements constitute an element of the offense.

In this

case, the requirement that the foreign Wyoming DUI statute substantially conforms to
I.C. § 18-8004(1) is an element of I.C. § 18-18-8005(6) because it is a special condition
which must exist before the foreign conviction can be used to enhance a misdemeanor
DUI to a felony DUI.

In fact, the substantially conforming requirement literally defines

the scope of the charging enhancement and, without that language, any foreign
11

unrelated to DUI could
cI

It

enhance a misdemeanor DUI to a

court

that Mr. Schall

it

ing conviction did

charging enhancement which

is an element

I.C. § 1

conform

the burden to establish at the preliminary hearing.

D.

/\t the preliminary hearing, Mr. Schall

district

take judicial

(c)(ii).

1 Tr., p.

request tflat the

ing Statute

, (b )(ii), and

'18.) The magistrate

judicial

the

on the belief that the defense had to lay the proper foundation

statute

it was "the burden of the

statute
Tr., p.29, LA

of

it

~

p.31,

the statute."

1

.) After the case was bound over to the district court, that court

noted that the magistrate could take judicial notice of the':) \jVyoming statute without any
foundation, but went on to hold that there was no requirement for the Wyoming statute
to be included in the magistrate's record. (R., p.64.)
The district court correctly recognized that Idaho courts can take judicial notice of
foreign statutes.

White v. White, 94 Idaho 26, 30 (1971). However, the district court

failed to recognize this it is the burden of the proponent of the foreign statute to request
the trial court to take judicial notice of the statute.

The Idaho Supreme Court noted as

such in the White opinion, which follows:
In the case at bar, appellant made no request that the trial court
take judicial notice of the law of Pennsylvania as to majority age. Having
failed to request judicial notice of that law, she cannot now complain that
the court did not exercise this power. A request for judicial notice of the
law of a sister state serves the function of alerting the trial court to the
contention that the law of another state is applicable, gives opposing

12

and

the

In the
appellant submitting the Pennsylvania
trial court was fully justified in applying Idaho law,

leI.

the

that the district

the proponent of the foreign
it was too late

judicial notice of the

the

an appellate court to tak(,; judicial

of

tute on appeal,
Luning that this Court

burden to f3stablish

that it was the

18

conforms to I.C,
that

\

),

district

prelinlinary hearing,

with the arguments

forth In Section I

Wyoming

substantially

State never met its burden
judicial notice

Mr, Schall actually attempted to

it failed

VVyoming statute
the \/Vyoming

the
in the

operating under a misapprehension of law, provided

and the mag

State with an opportunity to at least argue that the magistrate could take judicial notice
of the Wyoming statute.

(09/13/11 Tr., p.29, Ls.4-20.)

However, the State did not

advocate for the magistrate to take judicial notice of the Wyoming statute.
Tr., p.29, L.21 - p.30, L.2.)

(09/13/11

Since the magistrate never took judicial notice of the

Wyoming statute, there is nothing in the record it could use to establish that the
Wyoming statute substantially conforms to I.C. § 18-8004(1). As such, the State did not
meet its burden of proof at the preliminary hearing.
According to the logic of the White opinion, it would be too late for this Court to
take judicial notice of the Wyoming statute on appeal. It follows that the magistrate did
not have a sufficient record to bind Mr. Schall over to the district court because the
State had nothing in the magistrate's record it could rely in to establish that Mr. Schall's

13
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Ily

ing

1).

district

I/'s motion to

court

that this Court d

In the

Mr.

I(C) and I(D),

II

forth in

with the arguments
in the alternative, that

magistrate did not

probable cause to bind him over to the district court
conform to

I.C. §1

'1

. Mr.

that

the relevant portions of I. C. § 1

conform

the

the applicable
at

S. §

not substantially
1)

I. C.

from prosecuting a DUI if the defendant has a

percent, while in Wyoming tile

a defendant's BAC is

'1
under (J08

0.06 and 0.08

preclude the State from prosecuting a defendant for a DUI

In other words, VV.S.

§ 31-5-233 potentially criminalizes a class of defendants that cannot be prosecuted in
Idaho as a matter of law and, therefore, W.S. § 31-5-233 does not substantially conform
to the applicable portions of I.C. § 18-8004(1).
When

engaging

in the substantial

conformance

analysis

required

under

I.C. § 18-8005(6), I.C. § 18-8005(8) requires that "the comparison should be on the
elements of the statutes, and not the specific conduct giving rise to the prior violations."

State v. Schmolf, 144 Idaho 800, 803 (Ct. App. 2007). "The elements of the violation in
each state must substantially conform to each other."

Id.

However, "[s]ubstantial

conformity does not require exact correspondence between the two statutes."
804.

14

Id. at

1

(c)(ii). In comparing the
elements of the Idaho

statute and the VVyoming

se statute, they are not

substantially similar because Idaho defines a person as with a BAC below 0.08 as a
matter of law as not being under the influence of alcohol, while \Nyoming allows for the
prosecution of defendants with a BAC below 0.08.
In this case, the district court relied on Schmoll for its determination that

W.S. § 31-5-233 substantially conforms to the applicable portions of I.C. § 18-8004.
(R., pp.65-68.)

In Schmoll the Idaho Court of Appeals considered an issue of first

impression in Idaho, namely "which factors to compare and the standard with which to
compare them" in determining whether an out-of-state conviction was a "substantially
conforming foreign criminal violation" under what was then Idaho Code § 18-8005(8).5

Schmoll, 144 Idaho at 803. At issue in Schmoll was Montana's felony DUI statute,
which was being used as the basis to elevate a DUI to a felony in Idaho. Under the

5

The provision has since been renumbered to § 18-8005(10).
15

uent DUI

fourth or
IS

a

Iy a felony."

en

Id. at

1.

lifetime

Mr. Schmoll

that the Montana

ncement,

within

was

U

not a substantially conforming foreign criminal

In comparing

under

Montana and Idaho statutes, the

O.

Is noted that

a

or more, there is a rebuttable inference that the person was in fact

influence of alcohol when driving." Id. at
The

rt of

se DUI law; under Montana law if the

a

Montana
concentration

Montana

charged as a felony if broufJht in Idaho." Id.

have

could

was

rt

(citing M.C.A. § 6'1
with Idaho

Is

does not consider a BAC of 0.08 or more as merely rebuttable

'1(1 )(a)

, "Idaho
being under

the influence either; it is a per se violation of the statute to drive with a BAC of 0.08 or
more."

Id. (citing I.C. § 18-8004(1 )(a)).

Regardless of this difference, the Court of

Appeals found it significant that both statutes "prohibit the same essential conduct driving while under the influence of alcoho!." Id. It further noted, "Proving that a person
is under the influence absent a BAC test requires a greater degree of impairment in
Montana than in Idaho, since in Idaho, the ability to be impaired 'to the slightest degree,'
while in Montana, the ability to drive 'safely' is the quality that must be diminished." !d.

In conclusion, the Court of Appeals noted, "Montana's higher standard surpasses the
elements required for a violation in Idaho. These two statutes frame their prohibitions
using the same language, requiring substantially conforming elements to be met to
sustain a violation." Id.
With respect to the argument advanced by Schmoll before the district court-that
the Montana statute did not substantially conform to the Idaho statute because his
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conviction would not

been a felony under Idal'lo

law~tl'le

argurYlent was "misplaced" in light of Idal'lo
"tl'lat

comparison is

Court of

I.C. §1

section 1

and the fOrE3ign

was violated ... [whicl'l] is entirely independent from the consideration
violation

whether

In this

in a misdemeanor charge or a

/d. at

the district court relied on the fact that in Idaho a person can be

found guilty of a DUI if his/her ability to
ree, and in \/Vyoming a
is

charge.,,6

dimin

a vehicle is impaired

can
(I~.,

pp.

the slightest

found guilty of a DUI if the ability
district

court

noted

that

§ 1~5·233(b )(iii)7 contains similar safety language that is in the Montana statute
(from the Schmoll Opinion). (R., pp.66-68.)

on tile safety language the district

court concluded that Schmoll was controlling because it is easier to get a DUI in Idaho
than it is in Wyoming and, therefore, all Wyoming DUI convictions would constitute a
DUI in Idaho. (R., pp.66-68.)

However, the district court did not employ any statutory

analysis to Mr. Schall's argument that under the per se theory in Idaho a defendant
cannot be prosecuted in his/her BAC is below O.OS. (R., p.6S.)
The district court's reliance on Schmoll is misplaced because Mr. Schall's
Wyoming conviction was pursuant to Wyoming per se DUI statutes and not the

6 Mr. Schall recognizes that the facts of his Wyoming conviction are not relevant to the
statutory comparison. However, it should be noted that approximately one hour and
forty minutes after the stop, Mr. Schall participated in a scientific test which indicated
that his BAC was 0.066 and 0.06S. (09/13/11 Tr., p.21, Ls.S-12; see also Affidavit of
John H. Harris attached to the Amended Motion to Augment, p.2.) As such, Mr. Schall
could not have been prosecuted for his Wyoming DUI if it had occurred in Idaho.
7 Wyoming Statute § 31-5-322(b)(iii), contains Wyoming's impairment theory of DUI
conviction and states that a person shall not operate a vehicle if he/she is under the
influence of alcohol to a degree that renders him/her "incapable of safely driving .... "
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irment
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(\lVyoming Information and ,Judgment attached
ibit

Mr. Schall was not charged under Wyoming's impairment

§ 3'1

(iii), comparisons of that statute with Idaho's impairment

no guidance as
conviction is

question

Mr. Schall's

ntially similar. This distinction is critical because in Idaho there is a

nificant differencf;)
impairment

Augmentation as

pursuing a DUI
I n Andrus, the Idaho

on the

se theory versus the

rt of ,<\ppeals noted the

two theories as follows:
VVhile I.e. § '1
establishes only one
of driving under the
influence, it may
proved in either of two
and distinct
It
may
as
by the direct and
mstantial
of
the influence
alcohol. Alternatively,
impairment of ability to drive due
if chemical testing was performed in
with the statute, the
crime may be proved by forensic evidence that the defendant's alcohol
concentration
the statutory percentage.
The statutory
percentage is contained within the definition of the crime and is
conclusive, not presumptive, of guilt; driving a vehicle while one has an
alcohol concentration of .10% or more is deemed per se to be a violation
of the law. Evidence relevant under the per se theory of proof is not
necessarily relevant under the impairment theory.
Andrus, 118 Idaho at 713. Andrus is instructive, as the impairment theory and the per
se theory are two distinct and separate ways to pursue a DUI, both of which require

separate forms of evidence.

It follows that comparing the impairment portions of

Idaho's DUI statute and Wyoming's DUI statute will not provide any guidance as to
whether Mr. Schall's Wyoming conviction is substantially similar to Idaho's because

Mr. Schall'S Wyoming conviction is based on a per se theory of DUI. Therefore, the
district court erred when it relied on Schmoll because that holding primarily deals with
the impairment theory as opposed to the per se theory.
When the Court of Appeals' rationale in Schmoll is used in the context of
comparing Idaho and Wyoming's per se DUI statutes, it leads to the conclusion that
18

not substantially conform

statute

, under

still

influence if

that is impaired

a

ler

Idaho's per se DUI statute to \Nyom
with a

under 0,

while in Wyoming that same
Idaho

not

the

drive and, thus, all Montana DUI convictions
would constitute convictions in Idaho,

com

IS

drive,

then concluded that Idaho' standard

The Court of

than Montana's

that a

driving ability is impaired to the slightest

ree and in Montana a defendant is

is

the

impairment impairment

can be under the influence if h

Idaho at

Idaho's,

cannot

p

The

might
on the impairment

opposite is true when one

per se DUI statute,

driving under the influence,

of defendants can be prosecuted,

a higher per se standard than \/Vyorning,

In Idaho, a

It follows that

while all Idaho's DUI convictions

based on the per se theory would constitute a DUI in VVyoming, not all of \/Vyoming's
DUI per se convictions constitute a DUI in Idaho, Based on the logic of Schmoll, the
Wyoming per se DUI statute does not substantially conform to Idaho's, as Wyoming
criminalizes the behavior of a class of defendants that Idaho has determined is not
criminal as a matter of law,
There is an additional difference between Idaho's per se DUI statute and
Wyoming's, In addition to being unlawful to drive while under the influence of alcohol or
with a blood alcohol concentration of 0,08, in Wyoming it is also unlawful to have a
blood alcohol concentration of 0,08 or greater within two hours of driving, regardless of
whether the person's blood alcohol concentration was below 0,08 at the time of driving,

In contrast, Idaho's statute criminalizes the act of driving (or being in physical control)
while under the influence of alcohol (whether actually under the influence or under the
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or

S. § :31

this
that

were

ue

"prohibit
under the

alcohol .... " Schmo/l,144 Idaho at

The plain language of the VVyoming's

(emphasis

conduct than Idaho's statute, namely \!vyoming's statute
alcohol

a

In sum, under Idaho's

of

same

se DUI

could

p

such, all per se Idaho convictions will

D.

Wyoming

prohibits different
criminalizes

or

as a matter of law,
Wyominr],

same

driving.

a defendant with a
~le/she

under.

is not under the influence. In

if his/her

and

a conviction in \JVyoming, but not all

se DUI convictions will constitute a DUI in Idaho. In fact, the

not have been able to

drivin~J

would

Mr. Schall's VVyoming DUI had it occurred in Idaho.

such, and based on the logic of Schmoll, the district court erred when it denied
Mr. Schall's motion to dismiss.

CONCLUSION
Mr. Schall respectfully requests that this Court reverse the district court's order
denying his motion to dismiss and remand this case to the district court for further
proceedings.
DATED this 6 th day of March, 2013.

SHAWN F. WILKERSON
Deputy State Appellate Public Defender
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